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Abstract—Deep neural networks are facing a potential security
threat from adversarial examples, inputs that look normal but
cause an incorrect classification by the deep neural network.
For example, the proposed threat could result in hand-written
digits on a scanned check being incorrectly classified but looking
normal when humans see them. This research assesses the extent
to which adversarial examples pose a security threat, when one
considers the normal image acquisition process. This process is
mimicked by simulating the transformations that normally occur
in acquiring the image in a real world application, such as using a
scanner to acquire digits for a check amount or using a camera in
an autonomous car. These small transformations negate the effect
of the carefully crafted perturbations of adversarial examples,
resulting in a correct classification by the deep neural network.
Thus just acquiring the image decreases the potential impact
of the proposed security threat. We also show that the already
widely used process of averaging over multiple crops neutralizes
most adversarial examples. Normal preprocessing, such as text
binarization, almost completely neutralizes adversarial examples.
This is the first paper to show that for text driven classification,
adversarial examples are an academic curiosity, not a security
threat.
I. INTRODUCTION
The solving of classification problems in machine learning
has recently made significant progress through the use of
deep neural networks, or deep learning [1], [2], [3]. Deep
convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) can be used for
supervised learning, which is the use of a training set that
contains known outputs for the inputs during the training of
the DCNN. After training is completed, when presented with
unknown inputs, the DCNN is able to classify the inputs with
exceptional accuracy.
Although DCNNs have a high accuracy rate, images known
as adversarial examples trick DCNNs into classifying an image
incorrectly despite humans seeing almost no difference be-
tween the original and adversarial image. Recently, researchers
have proposed that adversarial examples can “seriously under-
mine the security of the system supported by the DCNN” [4],
because the incorrect classification could potentially lead to
an incorrect action with consequences. For example, if a stop
sign was crafted as an adversarial example, an autonomous
vehicle could complete an incorrect classification of the sign
and cause an accident to occur [5]. If the digits signifying an
amount on a check were crafted to be adversarial, the amount
of money transferred between accounts could be altered.
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Fig. 2: Set of legitimate and adversarial samples for two
datasets: For each dataset, a set of legitimate samples, which
are correctly classified by DNNs, can be found on the top
row while a corresponding set of adversarial samples (crafted
using [7]), misclassifed by DNNs, are on the bottom row.
Once the network is trained, the architecture together with
its parameter values ✓F can be considered as a classification
function F and the test phase begins: the network is used on
unseen inputs X to predict outputs F (X). Weights learned
during training hold knowledge that the DNN applies to these
new and unseen inputs. Depending on the type of output ex-
pected from the network, we either refer to supervised learning
when the network must learn some association between inputs
and outputs (e.g., classification [1], [4], [11], [26]) or unsu-
pervised learning when the network is trained with unlabeled
inputs (e.g., dimensionality reduction, feature engineering, or
network pre-training [21], [27], [28]). In this paper, we only
consider supervised learning, and more specifically the task of
classification. The goal of the training phase is to enable the
neural network to extrapolate from the training data it observed
during training so as to correctly predict outputs on new and
unseen samples at test time.
Adversarial Deep Learning - It has been shown in previous
work that when DNNs are deployed in adversarial settings,
one must take into account certain vulnerabilities [7], [8], [9].
Namely, adversarial samples are artifacts of a threat vector
against DNNs that can be exploited by adversaries at test
time, after network training is completed. Crafted by adding
carefully selected perturbations  X to legitimate inputs X ,
their key property is to provoke a specific behavior from
the DNN, as initially chosen by the adversary. For instance,
adversaries can alter samples to have them misclassified by a
DNN, as is the case of adversarial samples crafted in experi-
ments presented in section V, some of which are illustrated in
Figure 2. Note that the noise introduced by perturbation  X
added to craft the adversarial sample must be small enough to
allow a human to still correctly process the sample.
Attacker’s end goals can be quite diverse, as pointed out in
previous work formalizing the space of adversaries against
deep learning [7]. For classifiers, they range from simple
confidence reduction (where the aim is to reduce a DNN’s
confidence on a prediction, thus introducing class ambiguity),
to source-target misclassification (where the goal is to be able
to take a sample from any source class and alter it so as to
have the DNN classify it in any chosen target class distinct
from the source class). This paper considers the source-target
misclassification, also known as the chosen target attack,
in the following sections. Potential examples of adversarial
samples in realistic contexts could include slightly altering
malware executables in order to evade detection systems built
using DNNs, adding perturbations to handwritten digits on
a check resulting in a DNN wrongly recognizing the digits
(for instance, forcing the DNN to read a larger amount
than written on the check), or altering a pattern of illegal
financial operations to prevent it from being picked up by
fraud detections systems using DNNs. Similar attacks occur
today on non-DNN classification systems [12], [13], [14], [15]
and are likely to be ported by adversaries to DNN classifiers.
As explained later in the attack framework described in this
section, methods for crafting adversarial samples theoretically
require a strong knowledge of the DNN architecture. However
in practice, even attackers with limited capabilities can per-
form attacks by approximating their target DNN model F and
crafting adversarial samples on this approximated model. In-
deed, previous work reported that adversarial samples against
DNNs are transferable from one model to another [8]. Skilled
adversaries can thus train their own DNNs to produce ad-
versarial samples evading victim DNNs. Therefore throughout
this paper, we consider an attacker with the capability of
accessing a trained DNN used for classification, since the
transferability of adversarial samples makes this assumption
acceptable. Such a capability can indeed take various forms in-
cluding for instance a direct access to the network architecture
implementation and parameters, or access to the network as an
oracle requiring the adversary to approximatively replicate the
model. Note that we do not consider attacks at training time
in this paper and leave such considerations to future work.
B. Adversarial Sample Crafting
We now describe precisely how adversarial sample are
crafted by adversaries. The general framework we introduce
builds on previous attack approaches and is split in two folds:
direction sensitivity estimation and perturbation selection. At-
tacks holding in this framework correspond to adversaries with
diverse goals, including the goal of misclassifying samples
from a specific source class into a distinct target class. This
is one of the strongest adversarial goals for attacks targeting
classifiers at test time and several other goals can be achieved
if the adversary has the capability of achieving this goal. More
specifically, consider a sample X and a trained DNN resulting
in a classifier model F . The goal of the adversary is to produce
an adversarial sample X⇤ = X+ X by adding a perturbation
 X to sample X , such that F (X⇤) = Y ⇤ where Y ⇤ 6= F (X)
is the adversarial target output taking the form of an indicator
vector for the target class [7].
Fig. 1: AUTHENTIC VERSUS ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES. The
images on the top row of the figure are legitimate images. The images
on the bottom row of the figure are adversarial examples, and the
numbers below each of those images are the numbers that the DCNN
mis akenly classifies the adversarial examples. Adapted from [4].
In real world applications of deep learning which use inputs
from a camera or scanned images, such as an autonomous car
or processing of checks as mentioned above, the input images
will never be perfectly captured. The input images will always
contain slight transformations, such as shifting or blurring,
and perturbations, such as noise, due to the imperfect capture
of the input, which slightly perturbs the input to the neural
network from the intended input. As we will see, these slight
transformations render the majority of adversarial examples
nonadversarial, thus, no additional defensive technique is
necessary. In this paper, the acquisition process is mimicked
by performing small transformations that could be expected in
normal image acquisition.
The validity of a situation where an adversarial example
could be crafted into a real world application input and then
survives the image acquisition process needs to be assessed.
This research assesses the extent to which adversarial exam-
ples are handled and classified correctly, simply through the
natural process of acquiring the image, which renders the input
nonadversarial.
We also note that most state-of-the-art deep convolutional
neural networks (DCNNs) use multiple crops and often multi-
ple networks in reaching their final decision. To date, no paper
on adversarial examples has examined whether they could
survive this widely used component of DCNNs. We show that
even with ly 5 crops (on non-tr nsformed), compar d to the
10s to hundreds used in state of the art networks, the majority
of adve sarial image will be orrectly classified.
The problem addressed in this paper is whether adversarial
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(a) Original
(b) FGS
0.4860 | 549 | 26
(c) FGS
0.3885 | 1070 | 51
(d) FGS
0.3478 | 1334 | 64
(e) FGS
0.3132 | 1578 | 76
(f) FGS
0.1949 | 2604 | 127
(g) FGV
0.7727 | 358 | 57
(h) FGV
0.6527 | 666 | 113
(i) FGV
0.5665 | 969 | 170
(j) FGV
0.4919 | 1253 | 226
(k) FGV
0.4258 | 1514 | 252
Fig. 2: FGS VERSUS FGV ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES. The metrics underneath the numbers are the PASS, L2 norm and L∞ norm
respectively. Image (a) is the original MNIST image. Images (b)-(f) are FGS adversarial examples. Image (b) has the minimum perturbation
and  required to create an adversarial example. Image (c), (d), (e) and (f) have an  of 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, and 0.50 respectively. For MNIST,
the pixels have basically binary values (either 0 or 255) and applying an  of 0.20 with FGS forms perturbations with L∞ = 51. Human
perception can see deviations of 5-10 gray values when doing a comparison. Images (g)-(k) are FGV adversarial examples. Image (g) has
the minimum perturbation required to create an adversarial. Image (h)-(k) have 2, 3, 4, and 5 times the minimum perturbations respectively.
examples are a security threat to DCNNs and the extent to
which this is or is not the case.
II. RELATED WORK
Deep neural networks are learning models that produce
state-of-the-art results for several types of classification and
recognition problems [1], [2]. Szegedy et al. [6] discovered
that there exist perturbations which when included in an
image cause an incorrect classification by the DCNN but they
are “imperceptible” to humans. These examples were named
“adversarial examples.”
Since this discovery, several advancements in the under-
standing and creation of adversarial examples have taken
place. Sabour et al. [7] demonstrated that the existence of
adversarial examples could be the result of the architecture
of DCNNs themselves. Goodfellow et al. [8] presented the
fast gradient sign (FGS) method for generating adversarial
examples, which forms perturbations η
fgs
using the “sign of
the elements of the gradient of the cost function with respect
to the input,” that is defined as
η
fgs
=  sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)) (1)
where x is the input to the model, y is the target of x, and
J(θ, x, y) is the cost used to train the network.
Rozsa et al. [9] extended upon the FGS approach for
generating adversarial examples and introduced two effective
ways to produce more robust adversarial images using the fast
gradient value (FGV) and the hot/cold (HC) approaches. The
fast gradient value (FGV) approach uses “a scaled version of
the raw gradient of loss” to create adversarial examples with
distortions even less perceptible to humans. The perturbation
formed by the FGV approach can be defined as
η
fgv
= ∇xJ(θ, x, y). (2)
The hot/cold approach defines a hot class as the target
classification class and a cold class as the original classification
class. This method then uses these defined classes to create
features that cause classification to move towards the hot
or target class from the original cold class. In addition to
the different approaches to generating adversarial examples,
Rozsa et al. also defined a metric for quantifying adversarial
examples by measuring both the element-wise difference and
probability that the image could be a different perspective of
the original input called a Perceptual Adversarial Similarity
Score (PASS). This score is a number between 0 and 1, where
1 denotes an adversarial example with no visible difference
from the original image.
Rozsa et al. [9] also explored the effectiveness of fine-tuning
a DCNN with adversarial examples and showed that such
networks were able to correctly classify 86% of previously
adversarial examples, demonstrating the ability to increase the
robustness of a DCNN to adversarial examples with the right
training. In the context of this paper, the results attained by
fine-tuning with adversarial examples are complementary to
the results shown below.
Rozsa et al. [10] also contributed to the known information
about adversarial images by defining adversarial examples that
exist in nature as “an image that is misclassified, but that will
be correctly classified when an imperceptible modification is
applied.” Natural adversarial images demonstrate an additional
aspect of the security threat of adversarial examples that needs
to be considered.
In response to the growing interest and research in adver-
sarial examples, Papernot et al. [4] asserted that by using deep
learning algorithms, system designers made security assump-
tions about DCNNs, specifically in reference to adversarial
samples. Papernot et al. [4] attempted to address the problem
by demonstrating the use of distillation as an alternative form
of training a DCNN to increase the percentage of correctly
classified adversarial examples when presented to the DCNN
as inputs using the CIFAR-10 [3] and MNIST [11] data sets.
However, Carlini et al. [12] demonstrated that the assumptions
made in this approach are wrong and the approach itself is not
effective.
Papernot et al. [5] also presented a method for attacking a
DCNN with adversarial examples without prior knowledge of
the architecture of the network itself, and only having access to
the targeted network’s output and some knowledge of the type
of input. To accomplish this, Papernot et al. trained a substitute
DCNN on possible inputs for the targeted DCNN. After the
network was trained, adversarial examples were crafted with
the FGS method [8]. These examples were generated with
different values of , as defined in Eq. 1. Examples of the
FGS adversarial images generated with various values of 
can be seen in Fig. 2. The examples generated with higher
values of  do not fit the portion of the definition of adversarial
examples that the perturbations need to be imperceptible to
human observers.
A different technique for increasing a DCNN’s ability to
handle and correctly classify adversarial examples was put
forward by Luo et al. [13]. This technique uses a “trans-
formation of the image that selects a region in which the
convolutional neural network (CNN) is applied, denoted a
foveation, discarding the information from the other regions”
as the input to the DCNN. This technique enabled the DCNN
to correctly classify over 70% of adversarial examples.
The previous state of the art [14] takes crops of the original
input and uses the average prediction over the classified crops
which mimics natural perturbations. Crops like the ones used
in GoogLeNet predate the discovery of adversarial examples
and are used to improve accuracy of DCNNs. The improve-
ment of accuracy in the DCNN also also helped to mitigate
classification errors caused by adversarial examples. By taking
crops of images, the accuracy of the DCNN when classifying
adversarial examples is greatly increased. The networks tested
by Papernot et al. [4] did not use this previous state-of-the-
art. This research aims to assess the level of threat imposed
by adversarial examples to DCNNs as suggested by Papernot
et al. [4].
III. METHOD
The proposed security threat provided that in a critical
situation, the incorrect classification of an adversarial exam-
ple made by the DCNN could cause actions with immense
repercussions.
The image acquisition process as described above, which
is necessary in physical all real world applications of classi-
fication by a DCNN, is always going to capture an imperfect
input.
To assess the extent of the potential security threat that
adversarial examples cause for DCNNs after acquisition, it
is proposed that a slight transformation – such as a blur or
a shift that would occur in normal image acquisition – to be
applied to images before they are classified by the DCNN.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this method, a trained deep
convolutional neural network, a dataset including adversarial
examples, and transformations are used.
A. The Deep Neural Network
A LeNet [15] deep convolutional neural network, trained
by the authors of [9], is used for completing classification
a b c d e f g
Clean
FGS
FGV
Fig. 3: IMAGE TRANSFORMATIONS. The rows show transforma-
tions of a clean image, FGS, and FGV adversarial samples. Column
(a) is the original image. Column (b) has had one column translated
to black. Column (c) has a small amount of noise added to it.
Column (d) has the blur kernel of (2,1) applied to it. Column (e)
has been cropped to 27× 27 pixels and then resized back to 28× 28
pixels. Column (f) is a combination of all previously mentioned
transformations. Column (g) is the result of binarization with Oshu
thresholding.
experiments on the chosen dataset. As listed in Tab. I, this
network classifies images of the MNIST test set with an
accuracy of 98.96%.
B. The Dataset
The DCNN is trained on the MNIST dataset of handwritten
digits [11], and is tested with the MNIST test set. This
dataset provides a basis for a possible security weakness of
the DCNN to adversarial examples. If adversarial examples
cause an incorrect classification of a handwritten selection,
such as an amount on a check, it could cause the amount to be
misinterpreted and cause an incorrect amount to be withdrawn.
In addition to the MNIST test set [11], adversarial examples
generated using the techniques in [9] and [8] are also tested to
initially demonstrate the effectiveness of adversarial examples,
and then to assess the effectiveness of the transformations,
which mimic the acquisition process, at negating the effect of
the perturbations that create an adversarial example.
In initial acquisition, MNIST images were subject to a
pipeline of downsampling to 20× 20 pixels, binarization, and
subsequent upsampling to 28× 28 pixels. The adversarial
examples used in the following experiments were generated
by the authors of [9] for the network described previously.
When generating FGS adversarial examples, the authors of [9]
increased , as defined in Eq. 1, until the image was made
adversarial, so the entire data set is originally adversarial for
the network described above.
C. Transformations
The aim of this research is to assess the extent to which
adversarial examples can be handled and classified correctly,
simply by the imperfection of the natural image acquisition
process – i.e., slight transformations and perturbations added
to the input images for classification – and understanding the
impact each of these transformations has on classification. In
order to mimic the image acquisition process as accurately
as possible, an image was printed out, scanned back in, and
analyzed for the types of transformation needed to closely
replicate the effect of the acquisition. The types of transfor-
mations and perturbations that have been used to complete an
experiment and their justifications are listed below.
1) Translation: The addition of a translation to the images
processed by the DCNN replicates an alignment issue that
could occur in the normal image acquisition process. This was
implemented by shifting the image to the right by one pixel
and filling the pixels in the empty column with values of 0,
which in RGB values is black.
2) Noise: In the image acquisition process, it is normal to
see additive noise on an image, such as black dots seen when
an image is scanned in. To replicate the additive noise on an
image, a small amount of generated noise is added to an input
image before allowing the image to be processed and classified
by the DCNN. The noise mask was generated with a standard
deviation of 0.25, and a mean of 0. The noise mask was then
added to a copy of the original image.
3) Blurring: When acquiring an image in a real world
environment, such as with a camera or scanner, it is virtually
impossible to capture an image without any blurring. To
replicate this, the amount of blurring was estimated from the
printed image. This led to the application of a blur kernel of
(2,1) to the input images, as there was approximately one pixel
of blur in the x direction and one-half pixel of blur in the y
direction on the acquired image, with the asymmetry probably
due to the scanner having a moving linear sensor.
4) Cropping & Resizing: This transformation mimics the
event when the acquired image is smaller than the original
image. In order to mimic this, input images were cropped,
the cropped image was saved, and then the cropped image
was resized (using a cubic interpolation function) back to the
image size expected by the DCNN of 28× 28 pixels.
5) Combination: The above transformations each demon-
strate pieces of the whole image acquisition process. In order
to fully synthetically capture this process, the described trans-
formations must all be applied to the input images. Transfor-
mations were applied in the following order: translation, noise,
blur, crop and resize. This order was chosen to mimic the
order in which the transformations occur in the natural image
acquisition process. After transformations were applied, the
transformed image was input to the DCNN for classification.
D. Fine-Tuning
The described experiments were run both on the raw
LeNet [15] network, and on a fine-tuned network. The network
was fine-tuned because when it was trained, the network
learned from clean images without transformations. When
inputting transformed images for classification, the network
was not robust enough to correctly classify transformed inputs
– even if the inputs were not adversarial examples – with the
same level of accuracy as with clean images.
In order to fine-tune the network, a set of 100k images was
taken for training and 20k images were used for validation.
The dataset used for fine-tuning contained a total of 60k clean
images and 60k transformed images, where the transformed
images were the MNIST training set images with the combi-
nation of all transformations applied. The fine-tuned network
has an accuracy of 99.35% on the chosen validation set, and
99.09% on the MNIST test set.
E. Fusion of Crops
In order to more accurately mimic the previous state-of-
the-art deep neural networks [14], a series of crops was
implemented. As was previously mentioned, crops are used to
increase the accuracy of DCNNs. With only a 28× 28 image
for MNIST, the number and size of crops is more limited,
so we used only 5 crops: a center crop and 4 corner crops
of size 27× 27 pixels rescaled back to 28× 28 pixels. Each
image resizing used a cubic interpolation function. Each crop
was classified by the DCNN separately, and their predictions
were summed up to determine the predicted label.
F. Binarization
As is common in hand-written text recognition [16], before
applying the recognition engine, the image is subject to
preprocessing including binarization and noise removal. As
mentioned above, the MNIST dataset [11] was subject to such
preprocessing before being compiled into the dataset used in
training and experimentation. The exact preprocessing of the
MNIST images cannot be exactly replicated, due to an unclear
description including lack of details on how down-sampling,
binarization and subsequent up-sampling were performed.
Without details of the rescaling steps, we approximate what
we consider the most important step, binarization, using an
OpenCV [17] version of OTSU thresholding [18]. Binarization
is a critical step and takes into account the fact that machines
are trained on basically binary data. When it is forced to
deal with data which is not binary, the machine is more
easily confused. As we shall see, this single assumption
may account for almost all the effectiveness of adversarial
examples, and proper preprocessing renders them neutralized.
Pure binarization may not be effective on the type of noise
in [4], but the despeckeling/noise removal that is commonly
used for document processing [16], [19], would likely remove
most of that noise as well.
IV. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
A. Procedure
The experimentation procedure involved three datasets: the
MNIST test set [11] of 10k images, a set of 10k randomly
chosen FGS [8] adversarial examples, and a set of 10k ran-
domly chosen FGV [9] adversarial examples. All experiments
were run on all three datasets in order to generate a basis
of comparison for results. After running a baseline with no
transformations, experiments consisted of applying a trans-
formation or combination of transformations to input images
and then passing the transformed inputs to the DCNN for
classification. The results of the classification were measured
by the percentage of images correctly classified by the DCNN.
TRANSFORMATION RAW MODEL FINE-TUNED
None 98.96% 99.09%
Translation of one column 94.95% 99.17%
Noise 98.95% 99.09%
Blur 98.70% 99.14%
Crop (27× 27 px) and Resize 98.35% 99.14%
Combination 97.66% 98.88%
5 crops (on non-transformed) 98.67% 99.12%
Binarize (on non-transformed) 98.76% 99.04%
TABLE I: ACCURACY ON MNIST TEST SET. This table
reports the results of our experiments on the MNIST test set. The
column on the right shows the accuracy of the DCNN that was
fine-tuned on transformed images. For comparison, we also show
accuracies obtained on a raw model in the middle that was trained
regularly. Accuracy is the proportion of correctly classified images
that were transformed before testing as specified on the left.
TRANSFORMATION RAW MODEL FINE-TUNED
None 00.00% 56.93%
Translation of one column 65.29% 68.93%
Noise 28.41% 59.84%
Blur 58.60% 59.83%
Crop (27× 27 px) and Resize 78.28% 80.01%
Combination 79.68% 83.98%
5 crops (on non-transformed) 90.94% 81.66%
Binarize (on non-transformed) 99.24% 99.21%
TABLE II: ACCURACY ON FGS SAMPLES. This table reports
the results of the conducted experiments on a set of 10k FGS [8]
adversarial examples. We show accuracies obtained by testing on a
regularly trained “raw” model (in the middle) and a fine-tuned model
that was trained on additional transformed images as well. Accuracy
is the proportion of correctly classified FGS adversarial images that
were transformed before testing as specified on the left.
B. Transformation Results
The specific results of the experiments completed are de-
tailed in Tab. I, II, and III. These results demonstrate that the
image acquisition process allows the DCNN to correctly clas-
sify a large portion of what used to be adversarial examples.
The most effective transformation to allow the DCNN to
compute a correct classification is the cropping and subsequent
resizing of input images, which demonstrated 78.28% and
76.16% accuracy on the FGS [8] and FGV [9] datasets
respectively for the raw network. This transformation also only
slightly altered the accuracy of the raw DCNN on the MNIST
test set [11] (from 98.96% to 98.35%). Cropping and resizing
also led to the highest accuracy on the fine-tuned network,
demonstrating 80.01% and 78.70% accuracy on the FGS [8]
and FGV [9] datasets respectively and 99.14% on the MNIST
test set. After fine-tuning the network, the classification accu-
racy of adversarial examples increased, 56.93% and 62.09%
on the FGS [8] and FGV [9] datasets respectively without
applying transformations.
The results of this portion of the research demonstrates that
in the majority of cases, the effect of perturbations added
to make FGV adversarial examples are more easily negated
than the perturbations formed by the FGS method. Intuitively,
TRANSFORMATION RAW MODEL FINE-TUNED
None 00.00% 62.14%
Translation of one column 68.26% 73.15%
Noise 57.84% 64.59%
Blur 64.77% 65.54%
Crop (27× 27 px) and Resize 76.16% 78.70%
Combination 71.29% 75.95%
5 crops (on non-transformed) 81.66% 76.69%
Binarize (on non-transformed) 99.24% 98.88%
TABLE III: ACCURACY ON FGV SAMPLES. This table reports
the results of the conducted experiments on a set of 10k FGV [9]
adversarial examples. We show accuracies obtained on a regularly
trained “raw” model (in the middle) and a fine-tuned model that
was trained on additional transformed images as well. Accuracy is
the proportion of correctly classified FGV adversarial images that
were transformed before testing as specified on the left.
this is the case because the perturbations of FGS adversarial
examples are bigger and more noticeable, and are therefore
more likely to survive the transformations demonstrated in the
natural image acquisition process.
It should be noted that when transformations are applied,
the performance of the deep neural network decreases on the
MNIST test set. This decrease is the result of the added trans-
formations essentially creating natural adversarial examples, as
defined in [10]. These natural adversarial examples introduce a
different problem to the DCNN, because when put in the same
situation where an incorrect classification causes an incorrect
action, the natural adversarial examples would also cause an
incorrect action. While these actions would not be chosen by
an adversary, there would still be actions with consequences.
Although testing of the other transformations and the com-
bination of transformations have not produced results where
the transformation is completely negating the effect of the
adversarial examples, all of the transformations have improved
upon the accuracy rate of the DCNN on adversarial examples
without transformations.
C. Fusion of Crops Results
Doing experiments with the application and fusion of 5
crops was motivated by using the technique of the previous
state of the art [14] to improve accuracy of the DCNN. These
experiments produced the second highest number of correctly
classified adversarial examples out of all of the experiments.
D. Binarization Results
Binarization produced the best results out of the transfor-
mations, achieving close to the performance of the deep neural
network on the MNIST test set without any transformations. In
the binarization process, more FGS adversarial examples are
correctly classified than FGV adversarial examples and thus
are not surviving the image acquisition process. This is due to
the fact that FGS adversarial examples depend on bigger and
brighter collections of noise to render the image adversarial in
comparison to FGV adversarial examples.
E. Adversarial Examples on ImageNet
After seeing the modest success of the synthetic image
acquisition process on handling adversarial examples, an initial
experiment was run on a GoogLeNet deep neural network [14]
on a subset of the ImageNet dataset [20], with 15k FGS
adversarial examples, all of which were provided by the
authors of [9]. The experiment consisted of applying the
combination of transformations, as is described above. The
results of this experiments demonstrated that 63% of adversar-
ial examples were classified correctly for top-1 accuracy and
89.95% of adversarial examples were classified correctly for
top-5 accuracy. The fact that the application of transformations
are producing similar results for the MNIST dataset and a
portion of the ImageNet dataset demonstrates that foveation as
described in [13] could be applied to any place in the image
to negate the effect of adversarial examples.
V. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION
This project assessed the extent to which adversarial exam-
ples are a security threat and demonstrated the effectiveness
of simple solutions, such as slight transformations to the
inputs, at mitigating that threat. This research demonstrated
that slight transformations do render the majority of FGS
and FGV adversarial examples as nonadversarial. The best
results of this research, achieved through binarization of the
inputs to the DCNN, demonstrated performance near to that
of the deep neural network on clean images. For comparison,
this method classified 20% more images correctly than the
foveation method. These results presented that for the MNIST
data set [11], the potential security problem is negligible, as
the adversarial examples can be almost completely mitigated
through binarization, which is part of the acquisition process
of the original images. Therefore, when considering the appli-
cation of digit classification on checks, adversarial examples
are not a problem.
Outside of the classification of handwritten digits, when
considering an autonomous car, the camera capturing input
for the DCNN has the opportunity to capture a traffic sign
hundreds of times, each at a slightly different angle, rotation,
alignment and blur. This makes the chances of an adversary
producing an adversarial example that would survive the
image acquisition process significantly smaller than suggested
by [12]. If, independently, each frame that consists of an
adversarial example is correctly classified 90% of the time,
then to get a majority wrong – say 15 in 30 frames (1 second)
– would only have a
(
30
15
)
(0.1)15 ≈ 1.55 × 10−6, i.e. about 1
in a million chance of causing an error.
However, further research should focus on the effect of the
natural image acquisition process on adversarial examples on
a dataset such as ImageNet [20] in order to formalize and
assess the extent of the possible security threat to deep neural
networks in real world applications.
It should also be noted, that this research does not take
into account the case where an input from an adversary
does not have to undergo physical image acquisition before
classification is performed by a DCNN. For example, this
natural defensive mechanism of DCNNs does not apply to
an adversary who is attempting to bypass an image filter or
change the amount deposited into their own bank account,
because the input to the DCNN is coming directly from an
adversary without physical acquisition of the image.
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